Network Access Control and Wireless

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Avdelningen för informationssystem och -teknologi (IST)
Mittuniversitetet

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The lecture covers chapter 5.1 - 5.3 and chapter 7 “Wireless Network Security” in [1]. To check that you have fully understood these chapters, you should solve problems 7.1, and 7.2



Figure 5.1 Network Access Control Context

Figure: [1]



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Access Requestor

- Access Requestor, Client, Supplicants, peer
- Access the network.

Figure: [1].



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Policy Server

- Enforce access restrictions.

Figure: [1].



Figure 5.1 Network Access Control Context

Network Access Server

- Control access to Network.

Figure: [1].

- IEEE 802.1X - EAP over LAN.
- VLAN.
- Firewall.
- DHCP management.

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Extensible Authentication Protocol



Figure 5.2 EAP Layered Context

- *Framework* for network access and authentication protocols.
- Mostly encountered in wireless networks and PPP-connections.
- Extension to PPP

Figure: [1].

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Figure: EAP Protocol Exchange [1]



Figure: EAP Message Flow [1]



Figure: IEEE 802.1x operation [1]

- EAPOL-EAP – Encapsulated EAP packet.
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Wireless Network Security

Why wireless network are more susceptible to attacks.

- Broadcast communication allows eavesdropping.
- Jamming traffic
- Mobile devices
- Implemented on a variety of devices with limited memory and computational resources.
- Easy to access.

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

Figure: 802.11 protocol stack [1]



Figure: 802.11 Architectural Model [1]

Table: IEEE 802.11 Services [1]

Service	Provider	Used to support
Association	Distribution system	MSDU delivery
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

Figure: WEP encryption process

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- 802.11i - Robust Security Network
- RSN services
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  - Privacy with message integrity

- Replace WEP
- 802.11i - Robust Security Network
- RSN services
  - Authentication
  - Access Control
  - Privacy with message integrity



Figure: Elements of 802.11i [1]

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

Figure: 802.11i Phases of operation [1]



Figure: Discovery, authentication and association [1]



Figure: Key Hierarchies [1]

- Pairwise Keys
  - Used for communication between a pair of devices.
- Pre-Shared Key
  - A secret key installed outside the scope of 802.11i
- Master Session Key
  - Master key generated using IEEE 802.1x EAPOL
- Pairwise Master Key
  - Derived from MSK or PSK
- Pairwise Transient Key
  - Consists of three keys:
  - Key Confirmation Key (KCK)
  - Key Encryption Key (KEK)
  - Temporal Key (TK)

- Used for multicast communication
- Two keys are used
  - Group Master Key - Used to generate Group Temporal Key
  - Group Temporal Key - Used to encrypt the MPDUs
  - Changed every time a devices leaves the group.



Figure: Four-way handshake and Group Key Handshake [1]

- TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol)
  - Software backward compatible with WEP devices
  - Message integrity using a MAC (Michael)
  - Encrypts data using RC4.
- CCMP (Counter Mode-CBC MAC Protocol)
  - Use CBC-MAC for message integrity
  - Encrypts data using AES-CTR.

- Used for amongst other things generating nonces.
- Built on the HMAC-SHA1 hash algorithm.



Figure 7.11 IEEE 802.11i Pseudorandom Function

[1] William Stallings. *Network security essentials : applications and standards*. 5th ed. International Edition. Pearson Education, 2013. ISBN: 978-0-273-79336-6.